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This paper investigates trends in collective bargaining and worker representation in the 
German private sector from 2000 to 2008. It seeks to update and widen earlier analyses 
pointing to a decline in collective bargaining, while providing more information on the dual 
system as a whole. Using data from the IAB Employment Panel and the German Employment 
Register, we report evidence of a systematic and continuing erosion of the dual system. Not 
unnaturally the decline is led by developments in western Germany. One conjecture is that the 
path of erosion will continue until rough and ready convergence is reached with eastern 







While this process of institutional erosion may take a long time, in the end, the 
German model of industrial relations will more and more lose its exclusivity and 
distinctiveness (Hassel, 1999: 503). 
 
I. Introduction   
Shrinking collective bargaining coverage in Germany is not new. Among the first to 
identify  quantitative changes in the twin pillars of the German dual system of 
industrial relations was Hassel (1999), who noted the falling proportion of employees 
covered by sectoral agreements and a certain weakening in works council coverage as 
well. Hassel (2002) subsequently reaffirmed her erosion-plus-decentralization 
destabilizing thesis. A protean debate on the possibly cyclical nature of the trends 
pointed to by Hassel (see, for example, Klikauer, 2002) proved short lived as other 
observers were soon to chart decline along both these and also a number of other 
gradients, such as firm resignations from employers’ associations and sharply 
declining union density (see respectively, Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003a; Silvia and 
Schroeder, 2007; Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2003). That said, the scale and 
course of change have not convinced all observers of structural instability and the 
German system is often viewed as displaying path dependence through institutional 
resilience.   
But the overall evidence on the coverage of the institutions of German 
industrial relations is now both dated and piecemeal, and there is therefore a need to 
provide updated and more comprehensive information on the extent of collective 
bargaining and works council coverage. Has the decline in sectoral bargaining 
continued or has it subsided (perhaps as a result of contractual innovations such as 
opening clauses, pacts for employment and competitiveness, and weaker forms of 
membership in employer associations)?
1  Has decentralization led to increased 
adoption of firm agreements that dominate in the Anglo-Saxon countries? And does 
the course of representation in works councils point to a growing codetermination 
deficit?  
We seek answers to these broad questions using data from the IAB 
Establishment Panel, 1999-2008. Specifically, we shall chart the share of firms and 
employees covered by both sectoral and firm-level collective bargaining and, 
crucially, the default of no collective bargaining. We also chart the establishment 
coverage of and worker representation in works councils. In each case, we address full 
cross sections of establishments as well as their key constituents. Specifically, in  
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addition to the aggregate findings we are interested in the results for permanent 
stayers (i.e. continuing establishments observed in every single year of the sample), 
newly-founded establishments (or births), and closing establishments (deaths). 
To anticipate our findings, and as our title suggests, we conclude that the 
erosion in sectoral collective bargaining first observed in the 1990s is indeed ongoing. 
Moreover, the decline is across the board, being observed for each of the samples 
identified here. That said, there are marked regional differences. The erosion is more 
pronounced in western Germany, possibly pointing to the working out of a process of 
convergence. We even detect some erosion in codetermination, on which 
development there was no real consensus in the previous literature. Ironically, the 
decline in works council frequency detected here follows in the wake of changes in 
the enabling legislation in 2001 designed to promote works council formation (see 
Bellmann and Ellguth, 2006). Finally, there is no real suggestion of any material 
increase in firm-level collective bargaining.  
Not directly examined here are the causes and consequences of the erosion in 
collective bargaining. As far as the causes of institutional change are concerned, these 
have been variously attributed to globalization, new forms of organization of work, 
declining union density, and structural shifts in employment patterns among other 
things (see, for example, Ochel, 2005). As far as the consequences of the erosion in 
collective bargaining are concerned, these include changes in the responsiveness of 
wages to their underlying determinants, including the role of contractual innovations, 
and changes in wage dispersion. Investigation of both themes and in particular the 
impact of institutional change on wage dynamics is remitted to another occasion. To 
repeat, the more limited goal of the present exercise is to establish the facts of the 
case, to provide an updated and thorough description of changes in the dual system 
and the status quo ante.  
 
II. Some Opening Remarks on the Erosion-Decentralization Thesis  
The system of industrial relations in Germany is characterised as a dual system with 
two distinct pillars of interest representation. One pillar is regional, industry-wide 
collective agreements between trade unions and the respective employers’ 
associations. The other comprises works councils, legally-based bodies representative 
of all employees that operate at plant level. Works councils are endowed with far-
reaching information, consultation, and codetermination rights, in addition to their  
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role in implementing collective agreements and handling grievances. Formally, the 
former pillar is distributive in function while the latter is integrative. Strict rules 
govern their relationship, such that works councils cannot conclude plant agreements 
on issues covered by collective bargaining unless so authorised by the sectoral 
agreement. That said, works councils have long been involved de facto in wage 
bargaining, given the generality of industry-wide contracts.    
Given the highly complementary functions and mutually supporting interests 
of the dual system, the relatively centralized German system of wage bargaining, is 
widely recognized as having displayed considerable stability until the end of the 
1980s. In particular, the second tier of the dual system allowed German industrial 
relations to accommodate to a trend towards decentralization in that decade (Thelen, 
1991). As a result, sectoral agreements continued to dominate in Germany long after 
their demise in other regimes because of the substantial devolved labour powers of 
workplace codetermination.  
  The erosion of the German system of industrial relations since the early 1990s 
has been analyzed by Hassel (1999), who identifies a decline in the coverage of plant-
level codetermination and sectoral collective bargaining, that is, across both pillars of 
the dual system. Of the two, she argues that the decline in works council coverage has 
been the more profound since there are collective agreements for almost all economic 
sectors.
2  But on the collective bargaining front, Hassel identifies two major 
developments: a steady increase in the number of company agreements relative to 
central (i.e. sectoral) agreements, especially in western Germany where they are less 
common than in eastern Germany, and the corollary of a pronounced decrease in the 
membership rates of employers’ confederations. Hassel argues that the decline in 
coverage by German industrial relations institutions as a whole has coincided with 
greater pressure towards decentralization in collective bargaining. She distinguishes 
between regulated decentralization (via opening clauses, hardship agreements, and 
company-specific agreements) where the parties have sought to pre-empt pressures to 
decentralize collective bargaining by allowing for some differentiation while avoiding 
delegating decision-making rights on wages to plant level and actual deviations from 
standard terms and conditions in some ‘pacts’ where management has opened up an 
independent or substitute collective bargaining agenda from below. But she is 
concerned to warn that regulated decentralization may be no less divisive and 
ultimately destabilizing for the system than processes of decentralization from below.  
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In sum, Hassel contends that the German system is under challenge as a result of 
shrinking regulative capacity in conjunction with increasing decentralization 
pressures. 
In updating her analysis, Hassel (2002) argues that the evidence continues to 
support her erosion thesis. Drawing on survey data, she notes that between 1995 and 
1998 the plant coverage rate of sectoral agreements in western  (eastern) Germany 
shrank from 53.4 percent (27.6 percent) to 47.7 percent (25.8 percent). In terms of 
private sector employee coverage the corresponding values for western (eastern) 
Germany were 72.2 percent and 67.8 percent (56.2 percent and 50.5 percent). She also 
observes a further decline in the membership of employer associations (strictly 
speaking, only the case of Gesamtmetall  is investigated) which were becoming 
increasingly dominated by large employers, and a further shift away from sectoral 
agreements, again indexed by an increase in company agreements as a share of total 
agreements. She further reports a pronounced fall in union density (from 27 percent in 
1980 to 18.6 percent in 1999) and a sharp increase in non-unionized works councillors 
(up from 26.5 percent in 1994 to 33.3 percent in 1998). 
Now there is a growing literature on the changes under way in Germany’s 
coordinated model of industrial relations. However, as we shall see, much of this 
material has tended to focus more on the broad theme of decentralization than on 
presenting a comprehensive review of the facts of the case in terms of the coverage of 
collective bargaining or worker representation (or drawing on them in the manner of 
Hassel). Further, information on such representation tends to be either dated or partial.  
Consider first gaps in the factual evidence. We have rather patchy data on 
sectoral bargaining coverage since 2000. Much of the information pertains to 
developments between 1995 and 2001 (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003a, 2003b). Some 
more recent studies that confirm the diminishing importance of sectoral agreements 
identified earlier do not range beyond 2005 (e.g. Kohaut and Schnabel, 2007). Such 
treatments typically lack supportive data on the course of plant-level collective 
bargaining proper or the collective bargaining free zone and fail to identify parallel 
developments in worker representation through works councils.
3 Exceptions are the 
study by Addison et al. (2009) which covers the interval 1998-2004, and upon which 
the present treatment builds, and the ‘updates’ provided by Ellguth and Kohaut (2008, 
2010) in which close attention is paid to  the ‘holes’ in occupational and branch 
coverage. Another recent study by Kohaut and Ellguth (2008) also adds an interesting  
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wrinkle in distinguishing between closing, continuing, and new establishments. This 
innovation is also adopted in the present treatment.
4  
A second and indeed dominant strand of German research has focused on the 
mechanics of the decentralization process. Examination of the collective bargaining 
process has tended toward the view that on net the system is not destabilizing.
 Thus, it 
has been argued that experience supports the notion that German employers have a 
vested interest in maintaining the dual system (e.g. Thelen and Van Wijnbergen, 
2003), which admits of powerful flexibility, allowing outsourcing and other 
adjustments to change without precipitating conflict (e.g. Streeck, 2001) and remains 
distinctive by virtue of its pervasive cooperation (Frege, 2003). For these observers 
the dual system remains intact by managing to achieve “transformation without 
disruption” (Streeck and Thelen, 2004: 4). 
Hassel (1999: 502) would undoubtedly agree with this diagnosis for the 
category of large manufacturing firms. But she would argue that the system as a 
whole is unstable because its glue in the form plant-level codetermination is eroding. 
Concurrently, the emergence of a growing gap between highly regulated sectors with 
strong industrial relations institutions and poorly regulated sectors with weak 
institutions inevitably compounds conflictual relations between companies of 
different sizes within employer groups, adding to the problem of collective action on 
the part of these confederations. This interpretation has recently received support from 
a study of outsourcing in the telecommunications and auto industries. Doellgast and 
Greer (2007) argue that as core employers migrate jobs to subcontractors, 
subsidiaries, and temporary agencies, they introduce new organizational boundaries 
across the production chain and disrupt traditional bargaining structures. Attempts by 
worker representatives to re-establish representation in the new sectors has failed to 
restore coordinated bargaining. In short, this process investigation also calls into 
question the ‘transformation without disruption’ thesis for the two sectors examined.
5 
In the present treatment, we intend to provide chapter and verse on the course 
of collective bargaining and worker representation over a longer period than 
previously examined, distinguishing between mutually exclusive sectoral agreements 
and firm-level collective bargaining, charting the growth of the collective bargaining 
free zone, and mapping changes in works council coverage. Our maintained 
hypothesis is that if we observe substantive long-term institutional change the German  
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Our raw data source is the IAB Establishment Panel (or Betriebspanel), a stratified 
random sample of plants extracted from the population of all establishments with at 
least one employee covered by social insurance.
6 From the outset, the Establishment 
Panel was designed to provide a continuous analysis of the labour market in Germany 
and as a result it has an interesting longitudinal dimension, allowing us to follow a 
sizeable number of establishments in successive years over a substantial period of 
time. Over our sample period – 2000-2008 – the share of establishments that is 
observed in every single year (or ‘permanent stayers’) approximates 20 percent. The 
remaining 80 percent comprise pure panel rotations together with establishment births 
and deaths. 
An important component part of the present exercise is to separate out births 
and deaths, to determine whether the trends identified for the broad cross sections of 
the data, or for permanent stayers, apply in the cases of newly-founded and closing 
institutions. Unfortunately, given the imprecision of the establishment age question in 
the survey, the Bertriebspanel cannot provide an exact map of the year of 
establishment birth. It therefore proved necessary to use the panel in conjunction with 
the Establishment Register (or Betriebsdatei) from which all of its establishments are 
drawn to avoid miscoding births (and deaths). Full details on the procedure use to 
identify births and deaths and of the full set of thirteen categories making up the 
sample are available from the authors upon request.
7 To our knowledge, this is the 
first time such a detailed decomposition has been attempted. 
Over the entire 2000-2008 period, the raw sample contains some 140,000 
observations. The following filters were then applied to generate a sample of nine 
cross-sections: first, the selection of all industries except agriculture and the extractive 
industries; second, the selection of establishments employing at least 5 employees 
(since this is the employment threshold for works council formation); third, the 
excision of plants where information on sales is not provided; and, finally, the 
exclusion of any public corporations. To be included all establishments had also to 
have information on their collective agreement and works council status. These 
restrictions resulted in a total of approximately 75,000 observations. Finally, all our  
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detailed results in the findings section below are cross-section weighted, using the 
inverse of the selection probability. Given the nature of the weighting process, it is 
generally the case that an establishment is allocated different weighting factors in any 
two subsequent waves. 
 
IV. The Course of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation, 2000-2008 
Data on the extent of collective bargaining coverage and worker representation by 
establishment and employment for each of the nine cross sections of data is 
summarized in Figures 1 and 2.
8 Beginning with establishment coverage, we see that 
at the most general level collective bargaining has declined (panel (a), Figure 1). But 
the decline is confined to the sectoral bargaining. Specifically, plant coverage of 
sectoral bargaining is down from 47.3 percent in 2000 to 35.4 percent in 2008, while 
there is some tiny concurrent increase in firm-level collective bargaining. The 
corollary is a marked growth in the proportion of uncovered establishments: plants 
without a collective agreement of any kind have grown from 50.1 percent to 61.9 
percent of the total. For its part, the works council coverage of establishments has 
slowly but assuredly declined – consistent with Hassel’s (1999) empirical argument. 
When one turns to examine collective bargaining coverage and worker representation 
by employment (see Figure 2), the fall in sectoral bargaining is more muted (from 
57.3 percent to 48.1 percent), while there is again a modest rise in the share of firm-
level agreements. Nevertheless, the growth in the share of workers without any 
collective bargaining is still pronounced (up from 35.9 percent in 2000 to 44.2 percent 
in 2008). Interestingly, the share of workers in works council establishments vastly 
exceeds the share of works council establishments – since works councils proliferate 
in larger establishments – but the decline in works council coverage is still nontrivial 
on this employment measure (some 3.5 percentage points). 
(Figures 1 and 2 near here) 
  There are some marked differences in the course of collective bargaining and 
worker representation between the two halves of Germany. In the east, sectoral 
bargaining coverage by establishments is markedly lower than in the west but has 
declined less (compare panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1). In the west, equal numbers of 
firms had no collective bargaining as had sectoral agreements as early as 2002. If 
anything, firm-level bargaining is more entrenched in the east and admits of no 
decline (as is also true of the west). Although establishments  without collective  
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bargaining of any type much more clearly dominate in the east, the growth of this 
sector has been much smaller in the east. On the other hand, both incidence and 
pattern of decline in the share of plants with works councils is very similar in the two 
broad regions. What further regional differences emerge when we turn to look at 
coverage by employment? Perhaps the most obvious reading of Figure 2 (vis-à-vis 
Figure 1) is that although the aggregate results are more clearly driven by the west, 
the absolute trends tend to be closer. 
Two issues not considered earlier are the concept of orientation toward a 
sectoral collective agreement and the concatenation of works councils and collective 
bargaining. Beginning with the former, German employers often claim that though not 
party to a sectoral agreement they nonetheless orient themselves towards one. Now 
orientation toward a collective agreement may in the limit amount to little more than 
monitoring, but by the same token it may constitute rather more than that. Clearly 
further investigation of this issue is required to establish the practical impact of such 
comparisons. Pending that inquiry, here we simply ask whether the fall in sectoral 
bargaining/rise in the collective bargaining free zone charted earlier has been 
accompanied by (possibly offsetting) changes in orientation. At the start of our sample 
period in 2000 some 25.2 percent of all establishments covering 18.7 percent of all 
employees claimed to orient themselves towards a collective agreement. By 2008 
these proportions had risen to 28.9 percent and 22.7 percent, respectively.
9 However, 
the more significant result is that the growth in the collective bargaining free zone was 
greater, such that we observe a falling share of orienting establishments in this 
grouping; specifically, the share of plants claiming to orient themselves towards a 
collective agreement fell from 50.6 percent of establishments without a collective 
agreement in 2000 to 47.9 percent of such plants in 2008. It is therefore hard to resist 
the conclusion that erosion also attaches to the admittedly black box of orientation. 
Next let us consider the joint presence of both pillars of the German system of 
industrial relations: collective bargaining and workplace codetermination. Although 
again not reported in our figures, the proportion of establishments (employees) 
covered neither by collective agreements nor by works councils rose from 47.7 
percent (29.1 percent) in 2000 to 59.6 percent (35.3 percent) in 2008. The increase 
was monotonic in the case of employment. Correspondingly the proportion of 
establishments (employees) having both industrial relations institutions was 7.9 
percent (38.5 percent) in 2000, falling to 5.8 percent (32.9 percent) in 2008. More  
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specifically, at the start of the period, 6.5 percent (32.7 percent) of establishments 
(employees) were covered by sectoral agreements and works councils whereas eight 
years later only 4.8 percent (26.6 percent) of establishments (employees) were in that 
position.
10 This development indicates a clear erosion of the dual system. 
(Figure 3 near here) 
To what extent do the results formally reported thus far compound very 
different trends at a truly more disaggregate level? To address this issue Figures 3 
through 5 examine the same body of evidence considered earlier for three different 
configurations of the sample: permanent stayers, newly-founded establishments or 
births, and closing establishments or deaths, respectively. (To repeat, tabular results 
are available from the authors upon request.). Beginning with those firms that were 
present in each wave of the sample period – namely, the category of permanent 
stayers – the coverage by establishment data summarized in Figure 3 closely 
resembles that reported earlier for the full sample. This is not simply for the all-
German case but also for eastern and western Germany as well. Thus, for Germany as 
a whole, sectoral bargaining coverage by establishment declined from 50.1 percent in 
2000 to 40.1 percent in 2008 and the share of establishments without collective 
bargaining of any sort rose from 47.9 percent to 57.6 percent, somewhat less marked 
than in the entire cross section. Works council coverage also declined but again less 
markedly. We observe a broadly similar stability in firm-level collective bargaining 
coverage. There are no major differences at regional level.  
(Figure 4 near here) 
But greater differences emerge from Figure 4 when we consider coverage by 
employment. Thus, the gap between sectoral agreements and absence of any 
agreement admits of less convergence for the permanent stayer sample even if the 
trends in each are directionally the same. There are also some indications of an 
increase in works council coverage on this measure. But the main results still stand: a 
decline in traditional collective bargaining and growth in no agreements. That said, 
the decline in sectoral bargaining is much less in evidence for east Germany and there 
is no employment growth in the no-agreement sector. Both indicators in fact display 
broad stability. Firm-level agreements are somewhat more important in the east than 
before. 
(Figure 5 near here)  
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If the results for permanent stayers rather closely resemble those reported for 
the overall sample, what of the experience of newly founded enterprises? Figure 5, 
which presents results for Germany as a whole (regional breakdowns are available 
from the authors on request), indicates that the reach of sectoral agreements using 
either establishment or employment coverage measure is much lower than for the 
preceding groups and the importance of the no-agreement category correspondingly 
somewhat elevated. But although the changes are more muted we can say that the 
directional movements in each are directionally as before for employment coverage (if 
not establishment coverage). Thus, the employment coverage of sectoral agreements 
fell from 41.8 percent to 38.4 percent while that of the collective bargaining free 
sector rose from 52.6 percent to 54.3 percent. (For western Germany, the trends in 
sectoral bargaining coverage by establishment mirror these results.). Works council 
employment and establishment coverage declined for both parts of Germany but 
increased in the case of firm-level bargaining.  
(Figure 6 near here) 
Finally, Figure 6 summarizes the situation for plant closings and deaths. 
Perhaps the first observation to be made is that the collective bargaining coverage of 
plants that close or die is not consistently higher than that of survivors (although more 
so in the case of employment coverage). By the same token the coverage of the 
collective bargaining free zone is sometimes higher and sometimes lower among the 
former group. Nor for that matter is works council employment coverage greater. 
Rather, the distinctive feature of plant closings/deaths resides in trends that closely 
match those of the full sample. Thus, their sectoral agreement coverage by 
establishment (employment) fell from 31.3 percent (45.4 percent) in 2000 to 23.5 
percent (39.2 percent) in 2008. The corresponding increases in absence of any 
coverage were from 61 percent (45.8 percent) in 2000 to 74.2 percent (53.8 percent) 
in 2008. Pari passu with the full sample, works council coverage trended down while 
firm-level bargaining increased somewhat. 
Similarities in disaggregations of the data are more common than the 
differences. Vulgo: sectoral bargaining is in retreat and there is a rise (often steep) in 
the collective bargaining free zone. Reflecting the latter phenomenon, there is no 
suggestion of a sustained increase in firm-level collective bargaining. There is also no 
suggestion of an increase in worker representation through works councils. Indeed the 
evidence is to the contrary so that taken in conjunction with our other findings the  
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implication may well be that there is also a growing codetermination free zone. As a 
practical matter, closing establishments show no tendency to be more subject to 
sectoral collective bargaining than their surviving counterparts.      
Next, Tables 1 through 3 present evidence on establishment transitions into 
and out of collective agreements and works councils. In other words, whereas in 
Figures 1 through 6 we traced establishment/employment coverage of institutions in 
successive cross-sections, now the focus shifts to the behaviour of individual plants 
with respect to the same institutional set: firstly, on a year-to-year basis; and, 
secondly, over the entire 2000-2008 interval.  
(Table 1 near here) 
Annual transitions are first provided in Table 1 for overlapping cross sections. 
We consider all possible movements: introductions, abolitions, and no changes in 
status. The latter category includes situations in which the institution in question 
either ‘always’ existed or ‘never’ existed. Thus, for example, from 2000 to 2001, we 
see that 92 percent of all establishments in Germany did not change their 2000 
sectoral agreement status: in 44.9 (47.4) percent of the cases the sectoral agreement 
was always (never) present. By the end of the sample period, roughly the same share 
recorded no change in status (i.e. 93 percent). Alternatively put, 7 to 8 percent of all 
establishments change their sectoral collective bargaining status over the course of a 
year, which nevertheless amounts to a fairly considerable amount of churning. Note 
also that while 44.9 percent of the entire cross section was covered by a sectoral 
agreement in 2000 and 2001, by the end of the sample period just 32.7 percent of 
those covered by sectoral bargaining in 2007 maintained that status in 2008. These 
movements represent a quite dramatic pattern of decline and are indicative of the 
erosion in sectoral bargaining. (Confirming the evidence presented earlier, the fall in 
sectoral agreements is continuous except for 2004-2005.) A reverse pattern obtains in 
respect of those plants never covered by a sectoral agreement: these climbed from 
47.4 percent of the total in the first column to 60.7 percent in the last column of the 
table.  
Firm-level agreements rather give the appearance of being an endangered 
species, with around 97 percent of establishments never being covered by this regime 
in the overlapping cross sections. Correspondingly, changes in firm-level collective 
bargaining appear tiny. But again observe that in all cases the proportions refer to the 
share of sample establishments so that there is in fact fairly considerable outward  
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migration. And as far as works councils are concerned, we observe that they are 
present in roughly 10 percent of all establishments. Changes in status are fairly similar 
to those observed for firm-level agreements and hence are much smaller relatively 
speaking.
11 
Regional differences are most marked in the case of sectoral collective 
bargaining insofar as the share of ‘never existing’ agreements is much higher in the 
east by an almost 20 percentage point margin. Also note that the introduction of firm-
level agreements is consistently higher in the east. Regional differences in transitions 
in the case of works councils are altogether more muted. 
(Table 2 near here) 
These patterns in sectoral agreements, firm-level collective agreements, and 
worker representation generally carry over to the population of permanent stayers. 
The situation is depicted in Table 2. In particular, the ‘always existing’ sectoral 
agreement category is persistently higher among permanent stayers than for the whole 
cross-section (cf. the first column of Table 2), a natural result given that permanent 
stayers are on average of bigger size than the average establishment in the population. 
(Table 3 near here) 
Finally, in Table 3 we present eight-year transitions for the set of permanent 
stayers. As expected, for sectoral agreements there are now considerably more joiners 
and leavers than in the annual transition data. Thus, despite considerable institutional 
inertia, in approximately 20 percent of such cases establishments surveyed in both 
2000 and 2008 do switch status. In other words, one establishment in five either 
leaves or joins a sectoral agreement. The former predominate by about three to one. 
Unsurprisingly, changes in works council status over the sample period are much less 
common than for sectoral agreements, at around 6 percent of the total. But even these 
modest movements are larger than previously observed in the literature. In turn, given 
that only a small fraction of establishments are actually covered by a firm-level 
agreement, the reported share of bargaining cessations of 1.4 percent among all 
permanent stayers again shows that transitions out of firm bargaining are quite 
substantial – a little over one-half (=1.4/2.6) of them will quit bargaining by 2008. 
Over this interval, east Germany records smaller gross changes (i.e. introductions plus 




V. Concluding Remarks  
Our principal finding is that the erosion in sectoral collective bargaining first observed 
in the 1990s is ongoing. Moreover, the decline is more or less across the board, such 
that the similarities observed in disaggregations of the data (across permanent stayers, 
newly-founded firms, and closing establishments) in this regard are more common 
than the differences. One interesting subsidiary finding, however, is that closing 
establishments (if not their newly-founded counterparts) are seemingly no more likely 
at the point of failure to be covered by sectoral agreements than the generality of 
establishments. There are of course marked regional differences in levels of coverage 
and the process of change/erosion in also more pronounced in western Germany, We 
have even speculated on the possibility of a process of convergence toward the eastern 
pattern, a latter day Drang nach Osten as it were.  
We also detect some erosion in works council coverage. Although this trend is 
not always apparent in the data, it seems that Hassel’s (1999) empirical finding is 
supported. In other words, there is some indication of a decline in codetermination at 
plant level which may in turn support Hassel’s conjecture as to the vanishing 
distinctiveness and exclusivity of the German model. Interestingly, there is no 
indication that works council coverage has held up better in sectors with collective 
agreements. Be that as it may, the dual system seems to be in retreat. 
We found no real evidence of any material increase in firm-level collective 
bargaining. So this is not really where one should look for evidence of 
decentralization. Unequivocally, the pattern of external erosion charted here points to 
decentralization. Although we cannot directly answer the issue of internal erosion 
since our data do not enable us to pierce the veil of the application of sectoral 
agreements, the distinction between contractual flexibilization and breach of contract 
–   between regulated and formally destabilizing decentralization – may be moot for 
the reasons noted by Hassel. In any event, the facts of external erosion uncovered here 
and in particular the sharp rise in the collective bargaining free zone is testimony to 
the most fundamental form of decentralization, namely individual bargaining.  
The separate transitions data examined here also generally support the main 
patterns of erosion we have identified, while further indicating that there is not an 
increasing trend out of sectoral agreements into firm-level agreements. Indeed, such 
flows have ebbed.  Nevertheless, the amount of switching between the two types of  
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collective agreement is robust and further investigation of the dynamics may throw 
further light on the process of erosion.   
Finally, there are the twin omitted issues of causes and consequences. We 
noted at the outset, a number of explanations for the erosion of the German system of 
industrial relations, to which might be added the impetus provided by high 
unemployment (said to be caused by the collective bargaining status quo ante and 
wage settlements that display insufficient moderation and flexibility), unification (by 
providing a test-bed for experimentation), and a shift in bargaining power (promoted 
by a supply-side oriented economic policy of the European Union). Some such macro 
explanations may fare poorly in explaining the decline in sectoral bargaining (a 
seeming case in point being changes in industry composition; see Addison et al., 
2011) but other such arguments suitably modified to establishment level – say, export 
orientation and sales outlook – may prove useful in explaining the bargaining 
transitions identified here. Cross-country analysis of changes in the structure of 
bargaining may also prove illuminating with regard to the role of different levels of 
statutory support. 
In some ways the analysis of consequences – the evaluation and interpretation 
of the trends uncovered here – may ultimately prove more tractable.  A start has 
already been made in the literature in investigating the economic consequences of 
decentralization in the form of opening clauses and pacts for competitiveness (see, 
inter al., Brändle and Heinbach; Heinbach, 2007; Heinbach and Schröpfer, 2008; 
Hübler, 2005; Massa-Wirth and Seifert. 2005). The study of the impact of 
decentralization on the responsiveness of wages to their underlying determinants and 
upon wage dispersion may also help guide reform of other complementary labour 
market institutions and the social security system if support is adduced for a modified 




1. On these innovations, see Addison et al., 2009, and the references contained 
therein. 
2. She reports that the share of employees in plants with works councils in the private 
sector fell from 52.4 percent in 1981 through 47.3 percent in 1990 to 41.6 percent in 
1994. 
3. Studies of works council coverage are typically separate. The best-known such 
studies have been those conducted by the Institute for Economic and Social 
Research/WSI (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut) of the Hans-
Böckler-Stiftung. Every two years since 1998 the WSI has conducted representative 
nationwide surveys of works councils (see Schäfer, 2005). The surveys contain 
information on coverage as well as the attitude of works council members on 
collective bargaining issues, including the decentralization of collective bargaining 
through opening clauses and pacts for employment and competitiveness.  
4. Lacking consistent data, we do not consider employee representation vehicles other 
than works councils. On the reach of such company-specific forms of employee 
representation, see Ellguth (2006); Ellguth and Kohaut (2008).  
5. For a similar overall conclusion, based on an analysis of concession bargaining 
under pacts for employment and competitiveness, see Massa-Wirth and Niechoj 
(2004). 
6. For a detailed description of the dataset, see Fischer et al., 2009. 
7. In any given year, we can determine whether: (a) an establishment is in the panel 
for the first time; (b) it is a continuing or a newly-born establishment; (c) it is present 
in the panel in any of the following years; and (d) whether an establishment exit from 
the panel is due to pure rotation or an establishment death. 
8. Tables from which all of the figures presented here were assembled are contained 
in a longer version of this paper available from the authors upon request.  
9. As before, there were marked differences between east and west: in the western 
half of Germany the share of orienting firms (employees) rose from 23.2 percent (17.3 
percent) to 28.3 percent (21.9 percent), whereas in the east declines in both shares 
were reported. Full details are available from the authors upon request. 
10. Corresponding values for joint coverage by firm-level agreements and works 
councils were 1.4 percent (5.8 percent) in 2000 and 1.0 percent (6.3 percent) in 2008.  
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11. We also investigated movements between types of collective bargaining. For 
Germany as a whole, movements out of sectoral into firm-level agreements declined 
through time: from 1.0 percent in 2000/2001 to 0.7 percent in 2007/2008. The same 
downward tendency was apparent in both halves of Germany. And at a time of 
declining sectoral agreements, considerable movement out of firm-level into sectoral 
collective bargaining is still observed. For Germany as a whole, 18.8 percent (14.5 
percent) of establishments covered by a firm-level collective agreement in 2000 
(2007) switched to a sectoral agreement in 2001 (2008). Such switching was always 
lower – oftentimes very much lower – in eastern than in western Germany. Full 
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Annual Transitions in Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-2004, All Establishments, Weighted Data 
 
    From 2000 to 2001  From 2001 to 2002  From 2002 to 2003  From 2003 to 2004 




















Always  existing  44.9% 50.1% 25.5%  42.1% 47.8% 22.3%  42.4% 47.3% 21.0%  38.8% 43.4% 19.8% 
Introduced  3.6% 3.8% 2.5%  2.9% 3.3% 1.5%  2.9% 3.0% 2.8%  2.8% 2.7% 3.1% 
Abolished  4.2% 4.7% 2.4%  5.0% 5.1% 4.4%  4.5% 4.9% 3.0%  4.6% 5.3% 1.6% 
Never  existing  47.4% 41.3% 69.6%  50.1% 43.8% 71.8%  50.1% 44.8% 73.2%  53.9% 48.6% 75.6% 
Net  change  -0.6% -0.8%  0.1%  -2.1% -1.8% -2.9%  -1.6% -1.9% -0.3%  -1.8% -2.6%  1.5% 






















Always  existing  1.6% 1.1% 3.6%  1.8% 1.3% 3.3%  1.5% 1.1% 3.2%  1.3% 1.0% 2.7% 
Introduced  1.0% 0.9% 1.1%  0.8% 0.8% 1.0%  0.5% 0.4% 0.9%  0.7% 0.6% 1.0% 
Abolished  0.8% 0.8% 1.0%  0.9% 1.0% 0.6%  0.6% 0.5% 1.0%  0.4% 0.3% 0.9% 
Never  existing  96.5% 97.2% 94.3%  96.5% 96.9% 95.1%  97.4% 98.0% 94.9%  97.6% 98.1% 95.5% 
Net  change  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% -0.1%  -0.3% 0.3% -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 














  Always  existing 10.9%  11.1% 9.9%  8.2% 8.4%  77.6%  8.7% 8.8% 7.9%  7.8% 7.7% 8.1% 
Introduced  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  1.4% 1.5% 1.2%  0.7% 0.7% 0.4%  0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 
Abolished  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  2.6% 2.7% 2.3%  0.8% 0.9% 0.3%  0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 
Never  existing  89.1% 88.9% 90.1%  87.8% 87.5% 88.9%  89.9% 89.6% 91.4%  90.9% 91.0% 90.7% 
Net  change  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  -1.2% -1.2% -1.2%  -0.1% -0.1%  0.0%  -0.2% -0.1% -0.4% 
N  589,261 462,960 126,301  654,156 507,359 146,795  645,838 525,245 120,593  716,219 575,637 140,582 
Note: Establishments are common in paired years only, and will differ across pairs. 
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TABLE 1 (Cont.) 
 
    From 2004 to 2005  From 2005 to 2006  From 2006 to 2007  From 2007 to 2008 




















Always  existing  36.7% 40.7% 20.3% 36.2%  39.7% 21.3% 34.1%  37.7% 18.8% 32.7% 35.9% 20.3% 
Introduced  3.4% 3.4% 3.3%  2.0% 2.0% 2.1%  2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 3.2% 3.6% 1.7% 
Abolished  3.3% 3.6% 2.0%  4.3% 4.6% 2.8%  3.8% 4.2% 2.0% 3.3% 3.4% 2.9% 
Never  existing  56.6% 52.3% 74.4%  57.5% 53.7% 73.8%  59.8% 55.8% 76.8% 60.7% 57.0% 75.1% 
Net  change  0.1%  -0.2% 1.3% -2.3%  -2.7% -0.7% -1.5%  -1.9% 0.4% -0.1% 0.2%  -1.2% 






















Always  existing  2.0% 1.6% 3.3%  1.6% 1.2% 3.0%  1.5% 1.1% 3.4% 1.7% 1.2% 3.9% 
Introduced  0.6% 0.4% 1.4%  0.5% 0.4% 0.9%  0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 
Abolished  0.5% 0.5% 0.5%  0.6% 0.6% 0.7%  0.7% 0.6% 1.0% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 
Never  existing  97.0% 97.5% 94.8%  97.4% 97.8% 95.5%  97.3% 98.0% 94.4% 97.1% 97.6% 95.0% 
Net  change  0.1%  -0.1% 0.9% -0.1%  -0.1% 0.2% -0.1%  -0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%  -0.1% 















  Always  existing  8.4% 8.5% 7.8%  8.2% 8.2% 8.4%  8.1% 8.2% 7.8% 7.7% 7.8% 7.4% 
Introduced  0.5% 0.5% 0.6%  0.4% 0.4% 0.2%  0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.6% 0.7% 0.3% 
Abolished  0.3% 0.3% 0.4%  0.8% 0.8% 0.5%  0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Never  existing  90.8% 90.7% 91.2%  90.6% 90.5% 90.9%  91.2% 91.1% 91.7% 91.2% 91.1% 91.9% 
Net  change  0.2% 0.2% 0.1% -0.4%  -0.4% -0.4%  0.1% 0.1%  -0.1% 0.2% 0.3%  -0.1% 




 TABLE 2 
Annual Transitions in Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-2004, Permanent Stayers, Weighted Data 
 
    From 2000 to 2001  From 2001 to 2002  From 2002 to 2003  From 2003 to 2004 




















Always existing  46.7%  53.3%  26.0% 44.2%  52.0%  23.1% 46.3%  53.6%  23.7% 44.1% 51.4%  22.8%
Introduced 2.8%  2.5%  3.5% 2.9%  3.3%  1.9% 2.5%  2.7%  1.9% 1.5% 1.5%  1.5%
Abolished 2.7%  3.1%  1.7% 4.6%  4.6%  4.6% 3.4%  3.8%  2.3% 4.1% 5.0%  1.5%
Never  existing 47.9%  41.1%  68.8% 48.2%  40.1%  70.3% 47.8%  39.9%  72.1% 50.2% 42.1%  74.2%
Net  change  0.0% -0.5% 1.8%  -1.7% -1.3%  -2.7%  -1.0% -1.2%  -0.5%  -2.6% -3.5% 0.0%






















Always  existing 2.3%  1.5%  4.6% 2.1%  1.2%  4.6% 1.3%  0.8%  3.0% 1.8% 1.3%  3.2%
Introduced 1.4%  1.6%  1.1% 0.3%  0.2%  0.4% 0.5%  0.5%  0.5% 1.2% 1.5%  0.3%
Abolished 0.3%  0.0%  1.2% 1.2%  1.3%  0.9% 0.8%  0.7%  1.0% 0.2% 0.1%  0.4%
Never  existing 95.9%  96.9%  93.1% 96.5%  97.3%  94.1% 97.4%  98.1%  95.5% 96.8% 97.0%  96.1%
Net  change  1.1%  1.5%  -0.2%  -0.9% -1.1%  -0.4%  -0.2% -0.2%  -0.5%  1.0% 1.4%  -0.1%















  Always  existing 11.1%  10.7%  12.4%  7.6% 7.6%  7.7%  8.5% 8.8%  7.8%  8.9% 9.1%  8.3%
Introduced 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.9%  1.1%  0.5% 0.7%  0.9%  0.1% 0.2% 0.1%  0.3%
Abolished 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 3.1%  3.2%  2.8% 0.4%  0.4%  0.3% 0.4% 0.3%  0.6%
Never  existing 88.9%  89.3%  87.6% 88.4%  88.1%  89.1% 90.4%  89.9%  91.8% 90.5% 90.5%  90.8%
Net  change 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  -2.1%  -2.1%  -2.3% 0.3%  0.5%  -0.2%  -0.2% -0.2%  -0.3%





TABLE 2 (Cont.) 
  
    From 2004 to 2005  From 2005 to 2006  From 2006 to 2007  From 2007 to 2008 




















Always existing  42.6%  48.4%  24.2% 41.2%  46.6%  24.5% 37.7%  42.8% 21.7% 36.6%  41.4%  22.6% 
Introduced  3.0% 2.3%  4.9%  1.1% 1.3%  0.5%  2.0% 1.7% 2.9%  3.5% 4.3%  1.3% 
Abolished  2.8% 2.9%  2.2%  3.3% 3.1%  3.7%  4.6% 5.8% 0.8%  3.5% 3.2%  4.2% 
Never  existing  51.7% 46.4%  68.7%  54.4% 48.9%  71.3%  55.7% 49.7% 74.5%  56.4% 51.0%  71.9% 
Net  change  0.2% -0.6% 2.7%  -2.1% -1.8%  -3.2%  -2.6% -4.1% 2.1%  0.0%  1.1%  -2.9% 






















Always  existing  2.7% 2.5%  3.2%  2.5% 2.1%  3.6%  1.8% 1.1% 4.1%  2.1% 1.0%  5.2% 
Introduced  0.3% 0.0%  1.2%  0.3% 0.1%  0.9%  0.7% 0.6% 1.2%  0.3% 0.1%  0.8% 
Abolished  0.1% 0.1%  0.3%  0.4% 0.4%  0.6%  1.3% 1.3% 1.2%  0.7% 0.7%  0.7% 
Never  existing  96.9% 97.4%  95.3%  96.7% 97.4%  94.8%  96.1% 97.0% 93.5%  96.9% 98.2%  93.4% 
Net  change  0.2% -0.1% 0.9%  -0.2% -0.3% 0.3%  -0.6% -0.7% 0.0%  -0.4% -0.6% 0.1% 















  Always  existing  8.4% 8.6%  7.6%  8.6% 8.7%  8.2%  9.4% 9.9% 7.7%  8.8% 9.1%  8.0% 
Introduced  0.4% 0.4%  0.3%  0.5% 0.6%  0.1%  0.2% 0.2% 0.1%  0.9% 1.1%  0.5% 
Abolished  0.5% 0.6%  0.3%  0.8% 0.9%  0.4%  0.1% 0.1% 0.2%  0.3% 0.3%  0.1% 
Never  existing  90.7% 90.4%  91.8%  90.1% 89.8%  91.2%  90.4% 89.8% 92.0%  90.0% 89.5%  91.5% 
Net  change -0.2%  -0.2%  0.0% -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.3%  0.1% 0.1% -0.2%  0.6% 0.7%  0.4% 




Eight-year Transitions in Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status for Germany and by Broad Region, 
2000-2008, Permanent Stayers, Weighted Data 
 
 Sectoral  Agreement  Firm-level Agreement  Works Council 
    Germany West    East Germany West   East  Germany  West   East 
Always  existing 35.1%  40.8%  18.9%  1.2% 0.6% 3.1%  8.3% 8.5%  7.8% 
Introduced  5.0%    5.0%  5.0%  1.2% 0.5% 2.9%  1.4% 1.7%  0.6% 
Abolished 15.0%  16.4%  11.1%  1.4% 1.0% 2.6%  4.4% 4.1%  5.5% 
Never  existing  44.9% 37.9%  64.9%  96.2% 97.9% 91.4%  85.8% 85.7%  86.1% 
Net  change -10.1%  -11.5%  -6.2%  -0.2% -0.4% 0.3%  -3.0% -2.4%  -4.9% 
N  151,394 112,196 39,198  151,394 112,196 39,198  151,394 112,196 39,198 
Note: Transitions measured across the full interval shown here necessarily exceed the annual transitions 
provided in Table 2. 







 FIGURE 1  
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-
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Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Employment for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-
2008 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data) 
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Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment for Germany and by Broad Region, 
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Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Employment for Germany and by Broad Region, 
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Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment and Employment in Newly-Founded 
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Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment and Employment Among Closing 
Establishments (i.e. Deaths), Germany, 2000-2008 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section 
weighted data) 
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